I just highlighted a creationist microscopist who was (allegedly) fired from California State-Northridge for his religious beliefs. There were a few links in my last post you could click through. Here’s one passage from the article in Nature I found interesting (emphasis added):
If Armitage made his living bending metal in a machine shop, an employer would find it difficult to show how his views caused undue hardship, she says. But in an academic setting, telling biology or palaeontology students that life began only a few thousand years ago more clearly undermines the institution’s goals. “It would be an easier showing of undue hardship,” says Lisser, “because it’s more related to the essence of what the person is doing.”
I wonder how far an institution can go in defining and enforcing its goals. Does this situation fall under freedom of assembly? Why or why not? Somewhat ironically, the CSU system itself de-recognized Christian groups because they wouldn’t allow non-Christians to attain positions of leadership. But wouldn’t allowing non-Christians to lead a Christian fellowship undermine their institutional goals?
I suspect I’m reaching. The case law, statutory and regulatory requirements may be very different in these situations. I wonder if a smart legal scholar could explain if and how they are. And if these situations are actually very similar; if CSU is straightforwardly applying the principle of freedom of assembly to make their case, I hope said smart legal scholar will call out their hypocrisy.