I realize now that my last post sloppily blends two distinct points. I noted first that insisting on “the” rightful place of science is analogous to a football coach following the same game plan for every opponent. Towards the end of the post, I continued my long-running complaint against science-as-foundation. I neglected to emphasize that any a priori role for science is a bad idea. Permanently removing science from its pedestal is no better than permanently keeping it there. Sometimes science needs to be on a pedestal, and sometimes it doesn’t. Sometimes the game will be won by handing us the ball and getting out of the way, and sometimes we need to sit on the bench. But I’ve said this before.
I’ve suggested here that there may be real-world consequences for adopting any fixed role for science in policy, whether that role is one of deification or demonization. In contrast, my last post emphasized principled reasons to oppose scientific exceptionalism. From the final paragraph:
Now all this can seem hopelessly academic and pointless. Surely nothing much will change if scientists adopt a different vocabulary. Carbon emissions will continue to rise, the oceans will continue to acidify, and rain forests will continue to be razed. New words alone will not solve these knotty problems. Nevertheless, there’s something to be said for honesty in public discourse, and something to be said against exaggerating one’s virtues and abilities. If nothing else, minimizing the science-as-foundation rhetoric may foster a more honest debate.
At some point I’ll have to detail some specific negatives of an inflexible view of science in decision-making. But this is enough for now.
